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THE WAR WITH SPAIN.—I.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, COMMANDING THE
UNITED STATES ARMY.

THE recent war with Spain was the logical outcome of the conditions which existed in Cuba. It was evident, not only to this country but to all the world, that Spanish rule on this side of the ocean must necessarily cease, if peace and international harmony were to be preserved. The great Spanish nation of the sixteenth century, with its rich possessions encircling the globe, had so decayed in the nineteenth century as to be unfit in every way, physically and financially, to control not only Cuba but her remaining colonies. One by one, through the same misrule, Mexico and the South American States had found her yoke unbearable and had gained their independence, Spain thus losing these vast possessions and the large income derived from them. Cuba, termed "The Ever Faithful Isle," and Porto Rico remained. For more than a century, Spain had been a dying nation; while the effect of her rule, or rather misrule, in Cuba was a menace to the peace and good order not only of this country but of every other country having any relations with the island.

While Spain was in possession of Florida, a succession of disagreeable events had occurred in connection with our commerce in the Gulf of Mexico, which involved great loss to us, and which so marred the relations between Spain and the Republic that,

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after much controversy, Florida was finally ceded to the United States—largely as a matter of compensation to our country.

The Ten Years' War, with all its cruelty and horrors, had ceased purely through the physical exhaustion of the insurgents, only to be recommenced, with renewed vigor, with the insurrection which had been in progress two years at the outbreak of the late war. The voice of civilization demanded intervention. The "Virginus" affair, involving the massacre of several of our citizens and others, had not faded from the memory of our people; nor was the final adjudication of that incident satisfactory. The summary execution of the victims, under the circumstances, was directly contrary to treaty obligations and to justice.

The character of the war waged by Spain against the Cuban insurgents was cruel, and often barbarous, despite the warnings given by our nation that it should be conducted in a humane manner. It was becoming a war of extermination. "The Pearl of the Antilles" was ruined, and its population reduced many hundreds of thousands by death, in many cases from starvation. With a forbearance that, perhaps, no other nation would have shown, we had preserved the strictest neutrality at great cost, with much loss in our trade relations.

On the 15th of February, 1898, the world was startled and horrified by the blowing up of the battleship "Maine," of the United States Navy, in the harbor of Havana, with the loss of 253 of her crew. It does not matter now how this was done; whether or not any Spanish official was concerned in the destruction of this magnificent ship, nor how it occurred; nevertheless, the disaster caused great consternation throughout our land, and from that moment Spanish rule in Cuba was doomed. The whole nation with one voice demanded its termination. Party feelings were forgotten, and, on March 3d, Congress appropriated fifty millions of dollars for national defence. With this large amount, the executive department was authorized to make preparations for the impending war. The Navy Department succeeded in securing large quantities of munitions of war, including a considerable number of rapid fire guns and ammunition, some third or fourth rate vessels, and quite a number of others that were used as an auxiliary naval force; yet, such priceless jewels are the modern appliances of war that, even with the large amount of gold available, our Government was unable to

purchase a single battleship, a first-class cruiser or a modern high-power gun of the greatest destructive power. It requires years to build these great engines of war, and they cannot be obtained in an emergency.

On the 25th of April, Congress declared war, making the declaration that war had existed from the 21st of April.

Congress had been much more generous in its appropriations for the Navy than for the Army, and much progress had already been made in the construction of battleships and cruisers. At the time of the breaking out of the war, indeed, the Navy was in fairly effective condition, except for a shortage in ammunition, and it proved to be in every way superior to the Spanish navy. The magnificent results of the operations and the splendid record of the Navy during the war were eminently satisfactory.

Although, for many years, Congress had been urged to make appropriations for the adequate protection of our seacoasts, it had been so tardy in doing so that, when the war broke out, the condition of our coast defences was far from satisfactory. A very few modern guns of high power had been placed in position. It is true that much work was in progress, but it takes years to construct guns and to build emplacements for them, so that at that time it required many months still to accomplish the necessary results. Suddenly attacked by a first-class naval power, most of our seaports would have been practically defenceless.

The Army, of 25,000 men, was doing duty in various parts of the country, where for many years it had paved the way for the advance of civilization, and had afforded constant protection to the citizens on the frontier. It was, as far as practicable, well trained and in excellent condition. It was fairly well armed and equipped, and it was ready for any emergency, its officers and men having been hardened by service and training in the West. It was, as far as intelligence, physical excellence, discipline and devotion to duty are concerned, unexcelled by any military body of equal numbers in the world. 'Such a force, however, was not even sufficient to have properly guarded our seacoasts, in the event of a war with a strong naval power.

The Militia, composed of the National Guards of the several States, was, as a rule, inefficient, and, as a body, could practically be disregarded. Its arms and equipment were obsolete, and unfit for use by troops fighting an army properly organized and

equipped. Never, in the history of the country, was the necessity so obvious to the people for proper legislation for the re-organization of the regular Army, as well as of the National Guard. Smallarms using smokeless powder had been manufactured for the use of the regular troops, but there was not a sufficient reserve supply of these arms to equip even the small army called into service at the time of its mobilization. Our field artillery, our siege guns and all our heavier guns were constructed for, and used, black powder. This in time of action proved to be a great disadvantage; and, in fact, the regiments of volunteers which were present with our Army in Cuba had to be withdrawn from the firing line on account of the obsolete firearms with which they were armed, while the field artillery was subject to the same disadvantage. Had our field artillery been of modern type, using smokeless powder, there is no question that its proper employment would have produced much more effective results. The same disadvantage was experienced by the Navy during its attack on the fortifications at San Juan, Porto Rico, when the smoke from the guns to a great extent prevented efficient firing.

It is safe to say that, with an Army of 75,000 men properly equipped, at the time of the declaration of war, peace could have been secured without requiring a single volunteer to leave the country, and thus the necessity of the enormous volunteer army, and the expense and inconvenience incident to its organization and maintenance, could have been avoided. In fact, only 52,000 men were landed on Spanish soil before the peace protocol was signed.

The President was authorized to call for volunteers by Act of Congress approved April 22, 1898, and, under the Act approved April 26, 1898, authority was given to increase the regular Army to 62,527 men, while the Act approved May 11, 1898, authorized the enlistment of 10,000 "immunes", to be organized into ten regiments, and of 3,500 engineers, to be organized into a brigade of three regiments.

In the volunteer act of April 22d, there was the following provision: "The President may authorize the Secretary of War to organize companies, troops, battalions, or regiments, possessing special qualifications, from the nation at large, not to exceed three thousand men, under such rules and regulations, including the appointment of the officers thereof, as may be prescribed by the

Secretary of War;" and under that authority the 1st, 2d and 3d regiments of Volunteer Cavalry were organized.

The first two acts, going into effect almost at the same time, had a bad effect upon the enlistment of the regular Army up to its authorized strength. Volunteers naturally preferred their own organizations complete, and it thus became difficult to enlist men in the regular service, which it was most essential to have rapidly brought up to its authorized strength. Enlistments, therefore, were necessarily slow, while at the same time most of the recruits thus received were utterly untrained and unfitted for immediate service. It was decided to permit the regiments of the National Guard to go into the service practically as they existed at the time, but they were not so mustered in. A large percentage of the trained officers and men, either through business and professional obligations or for other reasons, were unable to go and were replaced by men untrained and unfitted for the service—in some cases, it is stated, not over one out of three going with their regiments. With such a condition of affairs, the difficulty of getting an effective force into the field, properly trained and equipped, was considerable. A great rush was made for appointments to commissions in this volunteer army. Many officers were unfit for the positions given them, thus adding materially to the delay in bringing the force to its necessary state of discipline and effectiveness.

I had previously recommended that 50,000 volunteers should be immediately called for, who were to be thoroughly equipped; and, shortly afterwards, that 40,000 more should be enlisted, to act as reserves.

On the 23d of April, the President called for 125,000 volunteers, and, on the 25th of May, he made a further call for 75,000 more. These, with the 10,000 immunes, 3,500 engineers, and the troops "possessing special qualifications", added to the regular Army brought up to its full strength, gave a total force of 278,000 men.

In order to secure a proper uniformity in equipment, and to promote the efficiency of the troops, the following letter was written and orders published :

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, D. C., April 26, 1898.

SIR: I regard it of the highest importance that the troops called into service by the President's proclamation be thoroughly equipped,

organized, and disciplined for field service. In order that this may be done with the least delay, they ought to be in camp approximately sixty days in their States, as so many of the States have made no provision for their State militia, and not one is fully equipped for field service. After being assembled, organized, and sworn into service of the United States, they will require uniforms, tentage, complete camp equipage, arms, and ammunition, and a full supply of stationery, including blank books and reports for the Quartermaster's, Commissary, Medical, and Ordnance Departments. They will also require complete equipment of ordnance, quartermaster's, commissary, and medical supplies, hospital appliances, transportation, including ambulances, stretchers, etc. The officers and non-commissioned officers will have to be appointed and properly instructed in their duties and responsibilities, and have some instruction in tactical exercises, guard duties, etc., all of which is of the highest importance to the efficiency and health of the command. This preliminary work should be done before the troops leave their States. While this is being done, the general officers and staff officers can be appointed and properly instructed, large camps of instruction can be judiciously selected, ground rented, and stores collected. At the end of sixty days the regiments, batteries, and troops can be brigaded and formed into divisions and corps, and proper commanding generals assigned, and this great force may be properly equipped, molded, and organized into an effective army with the least possible delay.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding.

The Secretary of War.

General Orders,

No. 54.

Headquarters of the Army,

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, May 25, 1898.

The following standard of supplies and equipment for field service is published for the information and guidance of troops in the military service of the United States. The allowance is regarded as the minimum for field service:

Headquarters of an army corps.—Three wagons for baggage, etc., or 8 pack mules; 1 two-horse wagon; 1 two-horse spring wagon; 10 extra saddle horses for contingent wants; 2 wall tents for commanding general; 1 wall tent for every two officers of his staff.

Headquarters of a division.—Two wagons for baggage, etc., or 5 pack mules; 1 two-horse spring wagon; 1 two-horse wagon; 5 extra saddle horses for contingent wants; 1 wall tent for commanding general; 1 wall tent for every two officers of his staff.

Headquarters of a brigade.—One wagon for baggage, or 5 pack mules; 1 two-horse spring wagon; 2 extra saddle horses for contingent wants; 1 wall tent for the commanding general; 1 wall tent for every two officers of his staff.

Allowance of transportation for regiment of cavalry, 49 wagons or 144 pack animals.

Allowance of transportation for battery light artillery, 4 wagons.

Allowance of transportation for regiment of infantry, 25 wagons.

Supplies to be carried in wagons per company: Ten days' field rations per man; 100 rounds of ammunition per soldier; 250 pounds of officers' baggage and supplies; tentage; grain for animals; utensils for each company mess, not to exceed 350 pounds for each troop, battery, or company; horseshoes, nails, tools, and medicine for cavalry horses, not to exceed 300 pounds; to each soldier or civilian employee (compactly rolled in one piece of shelter tent) 1 blanket, 1 poncho and 1 extra suit of undergarments.

Whenever the amount of rations or grain varies from the above, the weight to be carried per six-mule wagon may be increased or diminished, but should not exceed 4,000 pounds, and for four-mule wagon 3,000 pounds, and if possible should be less per wagon.

Whenever obtainable on line of march, full forage will be allowed all animals, the rate of purchase to be regulated by the quartermaster's department.

To be carried on the person or horse: One overcoat, 1 piece of shelter tent, 50 rounds of rifle or carbine, and 24 rounds of revolver ammunition.

Supplies to be carried on pack mules for one troop of cavalry: Five days' field rations per man; 100 rounds of ammunition per soldier.

The utensils for each troop of cavalry must not exceed 350 pounds.

The weight of load per aparejo must never exceed 250 pounds, and should, if possible, be less than 200 pounds.

Troop of cavalry, company of infantry, or light battery.

| | Troop of cavalry. Lbs. | Company of infantry. Lbs. | Light battery. Lbs. |
|--|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Field rations, 10 days: Cavalry, 100 men; infantry, 106; artillery, 125..... | 3,640 | 3,858 | 4,550 |
| Ammunition, 100 rounds: Cavalry, 100 men; infantry, 106 men..... | 725 | 769 | |
| Officers' baggage and supplies..... | 250 | 250 | 250 |
| Tentage (7 conical wall for cavalry and infantry, each: 9 for light battery)..... | 854 | 854 | 1,098 |
| Grain for animals, 10 days, 6 pounds: Cavalry, 115; infantry, 12; artillery, 126..... | 6,900 | 720 | 7,560 |
| Utensils for each company mess..... | 350 | 350 | 350 |
| Horseshoes, nails, tools, and medicines for cavalry and artillery horses..... | 300 | | 325 |
| Soldiers' baggage: Each 1 blanket, 1 poncho, 1 extra suit of undergarments, and 1 piece shelter tent | 1,662 | 1,761 | 2,078 |
| Total..... | 14,681 | 8,562 | 16,211 |

By command of Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

General Orders,

No. 57.

Headquarters of the Army,
Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, May 30, 1898.

After a prolonged period of peace our Army is once more called upon to engage in war in the cause of justice and humanity. To bring the military forces to the highest state of efficiency and most speedily accomplish what is expected should be the earnest effort and call forth the best energies of all its members of whatsoever station.

The laws and regulations which govern military bodies in civilized

countries have been developed to their present perfection through the experience of hundreds of years, and the faithful observance of those laws and regulations is essential to the honor and efficiency of the Army.

All authority should be exercised with firmness, equity, and decorum on the part of superiors, and should be respected by implicit obedience and loyal support from subordinates.

Every officer of whatever grade will, so far as may be in his power, guard and preserve the health and welfare of those under his charge. He must labor diligently and zealously to perfect himself and his subordinates in military drill, instruction, and discipline; and above all, he must constantly endeavor, by precept and example, to maintain the highest character, to foster and stimulate that true soldierly spirit and patriotic devotion to duty which must characterize an effective army. The Major-General Commanding confidently trusts that every officer and soldier in the service of the Republic, each in his proper sphere, will contribute his most zealous efforts to the end that the honor and character of the Army may be preserved untarnished, and its best efforts crowned with success.

This order is given upon a day sacred to the memory of the heroic dead, whose services and sacrifices afford us example and inspiration, and it is expected that all will be fully impressed with the sacred duty imposed upon the Army by the Government of our beloved country.

By command of Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

The difficulty of obtaining clothing and equipment for so many men was soon apparent. In fact, the canvas and other articles necessary for these equipments had not at that time been manufactured, and it would take a long time to supply them; while even the cartridges necessary to fight battles with were not in the possession of the government. Had our troops been available for immediate service, this fact alone would have rendered such service impossible.

Much time was necessarily lost for these reasons, affording Spain the opportunity to concentrate her troops in Cuba and Porto Rico, to supply them with food and munitions of war, to take steps to strengthen the defences of her seaports, and to render them as able as possible to withstand a siege; all of which things were done as far as lay in the power of such a Government.

On the 15th of April, the regular troops were ordered to be mobilized, the infantry being directed to proceed to Tampa, Mobile and New Orleans, and the cavalry and light artillery to Chickamauga. A portion of the infantry, however, was afterwards stopped at Chickamauga and went into camp there. These places were selected, as they were regarded as the most convenient points from which troops could be moved for an offensive cam-

paign in Cuba, which it was intended to commence as soon as possible. The work of equipping and organizing the troops was hastened with all possible speed. This, however, was necessarily slow. Efforts were made to purchase supplies abroad, with only partial success, as supplies of this kind, owing to the great demand the world over in these days of large standing armies, were difficult to obtain.

The history of warfare shows that operations beyond the sea are at best most difficult to organize and to carry on successfully. With the exception of the expedition of General Scott during the Mexican War, and our limited experience in the War of the Rebellion, we had had no experience, and we were in every way utterly unprepared in the way of transports and appliances for embarking and disembarking artillery, transportation, horses, etc., which, when required to be done at difficult points, and when the landing is contested by an enemy, are matters of great difficulty, requiring exact and full preparation to be successful. Transports had to be purchased or hired and put in condition for the use of troops, animals, stores, etc. The climate of Cuba and Porto Rico being necessarily hot and enervating, and storms and hurricanes being liable to occur in the season during which these operations were to be carried on, it was of the utmost importance, for the safety and health of the troops, that proper arrangements should be made for feeding and clothing them, and that this object should have the most solicitous attention from the authorities.

The lessons taught by the expeditions made by the British in this section were of immense value. San Juan, in Porto Rico, had been attacked by Sir Ralph Abercrombie in 1795, unsuccessfully. He stated that the expedition had been undertaken too lightly, that he had found Porto Rico well supplied, and that there was powerful artillery there. Havana had been besieged in 1762 by a large fleet, under Admiral Pocock, of the British Navy, and a force of about 15,000 men under Lord Albemarle. This force was landed on the 5th of June in the same year. Havana surrendered after a siege on the 13th day of August. It had been necessary to effect the reduction of the works, which were very strong, especially the Morro Castle, by regular approaches, and under very unfavorable circumstances. In this attack, about 5,000 troops from New England were used, yet two of the trans-

ports carrying them over were captured by the French, who were also at war with England at that time, about 500 of the Americans being taken with them. The losses of the British in this campaign were far greater from disease than from battle, being in all between 1,700 and 1,800 men, while the Spanish force opposed to them was about 28,000, or about twice the strength of the British. It is said, however, that at one time almost half the British force was on the sick report.

In 1553, the French occupied Santiago, evacuating it afterwards on the payment by the Spanish of \$80,000, as a ransom. In October, 1662, a British fleet appeared off Santiago, and 900 men were landed at Aguadores, who, although opposed by the Spanish, marched on and seized Santiago. In July, 1741, a British fleet, under Admiral Vernon, sailed to Guantanamo, and a force of 5,000 men under General Wentworth, of the British Army, was landed there.

At the commencement of the recent war, the general impression was that the Spanish were much stronger on the sea than they proved to be. In fact, their want of energy was most remarkable. Even with the vessels that they had, handled by such sailors as the British or our own, they could have done untold damage to us. With their fleets free to act and their whereabouts unknown, the embarkation of a large number of troops at best was hazardous. Good judgment demanded that, before such operations should be commenced, these fleets should be destroyed or captured, and it was my opinion that no extended movement should take place until this was done, as was indicated in the following letter which I wrote to the Secretary of War:

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, D. C., April 18, 1898.

SIR: Referring to my former letters concerning healthful camps for the troops and the uncertainty of Congress requiring an army to move to Cuba at this season of the year, I would respectfully call attention to the letter of the Surgeon-General of the Army, dated Washington, March 25, of this year, as to the danger of putting an army in Cuba during what is known as the "rainy" or "sickly" season. That opinion is also confirmed by reports of Dr. James Guiteras, of Philadelphia, a well-known authority on yellow fever, and others.

In my opinion it is extremely hazardous, and I think it would be injudicious, to put an army on that island at this season of the year, as it would undoubtedly be decimated by the deadly disease, to say nothing of having to cope with some 80,000 troops, the remnant of 214,000, that have become acclimated, and that are equipped with 183 guns.

And still another element of extreme danger would be to place an army there with the possibility of our own Navy not being able to keep the waters between our own territory and that island clear of hostile ships or fleets.

By mobilizing our force and putting it in healthful camps and using such force as might be necessary to harass the enemy and doing them the greatest injury with the least possible loss to ourselves, if our Navy is superior to theirs, in my judgment, we can compel the surrender of the army on the Island of Cuba with very little loss of life and possibly avoid the spread of yellow fever over our own country.

There is still time, if this is favorably considered, to put a small force of regular troops, number approximately 18,000 men, in healthful camps until such time as they can be used on the Island of Cuba with safety.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding.

The Secretary of War.

The plan of campaign was carefully considered. The wet season, which would be especially dangerous to the lives of those not acclimated, and would render the movements of troops more difficult, was near at hand. It was utterly impossible to organize an army and equip it properly before that season commenced. Spain's army in Cuba was strong, well organized, and seasoned after long fighting with the insurgents. I was ordered, however, on May 9th, to take 70,000 men to Cuba, for the purpose of commencing hostilities immediately, and I sent the necessary orders for the movement of the advance corps, and instructions as to its landing on the north coast of Cuba; and supplies for ninety days for the men and thirty days for the animals were ordered concentrated at Tampa, Florida. It is with great reluctance that one hesitates to accept the command of an army of that magnitude in the field; yet, knowing the condition of the troops, the strength of the enemy, and the near approach of the sickly season in a district infested with yellow fever, I considered it my duty not only to the troops, whose lives must necessarily be sacrificed, but to the country, to explain fully to the highest authority the serious objections to such a movement at that time, and also to express my regret that I felt called upon to state such objections. The army was enthusiastic, composed of the best young men of the land, brave and resolute, but, outside of the regular regiments, not properly instructed and very insufficiently equipped, as far as proper clothing, tentage, camp equipage and transportation, hospital supplies, and all other munitions of war were concerned.

The most serious objection, however, to the movement of such an army, but partly organized, to encounter an enemy well equipped and acclimated, was the fact that, after assembling the amount of ammunition required by the troops going to Manila, and leaving a small amount for the troops necessary to guard the Atlantic coast, supporting the batteries, and to protect it against the possibility of any force landing on our shores, there was not ammunition enough left in the United States to last an army of 70,000 men in one hour's serious battle. Although the cartridge factories were making the only kind of ammunition that could be used by the troops with the Springfield and Krag-Jørgensen rifles, it was impossible for them to manufacture a sufficient amount to equip an army of the size mentioned to encounter a foreign army of equal strength in less than sixty days. These facts I reluctantly presented, and it was as reluctantly decided that the army must not move until it was ready. The feeling at that time in the country was one of impatience, amounting almost to impetuosity, and the cry of "On to Havana" was similar to that of "On to Richmond" in June of 1861.

In the public journals of that time may be found the following statement from myself in regard to this vital question:

"Regarding the matter of invading Cuba, General Miles says: 'With regard to the invasion of Cuba, I have nothing to say, except that the United States will in due time bring Cuba under its control by judicious methods and without useless waste of life. The United States is too great, too strong and too powerful to commit any foolish act in connection with the proposed invasion. As for myself, I have only to say that no officer is fit to command the troops who from any motive whatever would needlessly risk the life of a single soldier either from disease or the bullets of the enemy. I have never sacrificed the lives of the men under my command, and I do not propose to subject them to any unnecessary risks in the present campaign.'"

With a properly equipped army ready for action before the bad season set in, we could have divided Cuba into two or more sections, occupying the greater portion of the country, placing the troops in healthful localities, thus enabling the insurgents to organize and become thoroughly equipped, and simplifying the problem; and, with the Spanish Navy once cleared from the seas, and the coast thoroughly patrolled by our vessels, the Spanish forces must have yielded in a few months. The investment of Havana could have been effected at our leisure, and that city forced to surrender, in all probability, with inconsiderable loss.

Troops not being ready, and as the necessary army would not be available for at least two months at best, it was decided to send smaller expeditions to the coast of Cuba and supply the insurgents with arms, ammunition and rations. Several expeditions were organized and sent out with this object in view—those organized under Col. Hall, Capt. J. J. O'Donnell, Lieut. Crofton and Capt. Dorst with good results, a large amount of arms, ammunition and other supplies being successfully distributed. In addition to his other expeditions, on May 9th, 1898, Captain Dorst left Tampa for Cuba. Going to Key West, he thence sailed north and passed to the north side of the island of New Providence, thence south to the northeast coast of Cuba, going into the small harbor of Banes, which had all the time been held by the Cuban insurgents. He remained there for five days, and succeeded in landing 7,500 rifles, a million cartridges, 5,000 uniforms and a steamerload of supplies. This was a great boon to General Garcia's troops, who had been valiantly contending against upwards of 30,000 Spanish troops located in the eastern portion of Cuba.

Another expedition, much stronger, to consist of 5,000 or 6,000 men, with a large amount of supplies, was directed to be organized and placed under the command of General William R. Shafter. This expedition was to have landed on the south coast of Cuba and, strongly convoyed by war vessels, was to form a base of supplies for the insurgents. Important results were expected from it, and its organization was carried on as rapidly as possible; but shortly before it was ready to sail, information was received that Cervera's fleet had left Spain. This rendered the movement of the expedition very hazardous, besides which the Navy needed all its ships of war to meet the enemy's fleet.

On the 30th of May, it was finally ascertained that the Spanish fleet had taken refuge in the harbor of Santiago, and was there blockaded. In view of the supposed strength of the defences of the harbor and the presence of mines in the entrance, the Navy reported it impossible to enter and destroy this fleet, unless assisted by an army sufficiently strong to dislodge the troops guarding the entrance, they being thus enabled to take up the mines. The expedition above referred to was abandoned, and it was decided to organize another one of sufficient size to accomplish, in conjunction with our fleet, the capture or destruction of that of the enemy in the harbor of Santiago. General Shafter, being then the

senior general officer at Tampa, was designated to command this expedition.

Urgent despatches came from Admiral Sampson, stating the necessity of immediately sending a force to capture the garrison. On the 6th of June, he reported that he had silenced the forts and that "if 10,000 men were here, city and fleet could be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet."

The following day General Shafter was directed by the Secretary of War to sail immediately.

Later, on the same day, the same authority directed him, by order of the President, to sail at once with what force he had ready, provided it was 10,000 strong.

On the 30th of May, I left Washington for Tampa, arriving there early on the morning of June 1st.

In order to utilize as far as possible the assistance of the Cuban insurgent forces in Eastern Cuba, I sent the following communication to General Garcia on the 2nd of June:

Headquarters of the Army,

In the Field, Tampa, Fla., June 2, 1898.

DEAR GENERAL: I am very glad to have received your officers, General Enrique Collazo and Lieut. Col. Carlos Hernandez, the latter of whom returns to-night with our best wishes for your success.

It would be a very great assistance if you could have as large a force as possible in the vicinity of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and communicate any information, by signals, which Colonel Hernandez will explain to you, either to our navy or to our army on its arrival, which we hope will be before many days.

It would also assist us very much if you could drive in and harass any Spanish troops near or in Santiago de Cuba, threatening or attacking them at all points, and preventing, by every means, any possible reinforcement coming to that garrison. While this is being done, and before the arrival of our army if you can seize and hold any commanding position to the east or west of Santiago de Cuba, or both, that would be advantageous for the use of our artillery, it will be exceedingly gratifying to us.

With great respect and best wishes, I remain, very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding United States Army.

Lieutenant-General Garcia, Cuban Army.

Colonel Hernandez, one of General Garcia's staff officers, left Key West with this letter on June 2d; General Garcia received it on June 6th, and I received his reply by cable on June 9th, as follows:

Mole St. Nicholas (via Washington), June 9, 1898.

General MILES,

Commanding United States Army:

Garcia's reply on June 6 to your letter of June 2:

"Will take measures at once to carry out your recommendation, but concentration of force will require some time. Roads bad and Cubans scattered. Will march without delay. Santiago de Cuba well fortified with advanced intrenchments, but believe good artillery position can be taken. Spanish force approximates 12,000 between Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo, 3,000 militia. Will maintain a Cuban force near Holguin to prevent sending re-enforcements to Santiago."

The above given to me by Admiral Sampson to forward to you.

ALLEN.

The following is an extract from a cable message from Admiral Sampson to the Secretary of the Navy, which was repeated to me at Tampa on June 12th, for my information:

Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti.

General Miles's letter received through Colonel Hernandez on June 6. Garcia regards his wishes and suggestions as orders, and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of his expedition to Banes Port, Cuba, but he will march without delay. All of his subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United States troops and to place themselves under orders. Santiago de Cuba well fortified, with advanced intrenchments, but he believes position for artillery can be taken as Miles desires. (Approximate) twelve thousand (12,000) regulars and three thousand (3,000) militia between Santiago and Guantanamo. He has sent force in order to prevent aid going to Santiago from Holguin. Repeats every assurance of good will, and desires to second plans.

SAMPSON.

It will be observed that General Garcia regarded my requests as his orders, and promptly took steps to execute the plan of operations. He sent 3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000 Spaniards stationed at Holguin. A portion of this latter force started to the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was successfully checked and turned back by the Cuban forces under General Fera. General Garcia also sent 2,000 men, under Perez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guantanamo, and they were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men, under General Rios, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this garrison, 3,500 started to reinforce the garrison at Santiago, and were engaged in no less than thirty combats with the Cubans on their way before reaching Santiago. With an additional force of 5,000 men, General Garcia besieged the garrison of Santiago, taking up a strong position on the west side of the harbor, and he afterwards received Admiral Sampson and General Shafter at his

camp near that place. He had troops in the rear, as well as on both sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our troops.

The expedition for Santiago was delayed at Tampa, on account of the reported presence along the northern coast of Cuba of some Spanish war vessels, but it finally sailed on the 14th of June.

As most of the regular Army was included in this expedition, and on account of the importance of the enterprise, I desired to go with it, but was directed to return to Washington.

It cannot be denied that this expedition left in a very unsatisfactory condition, as regards accommodations on the transports for the men and animals, and the necessary facilities for landing troops. Fair weather, however, attended the expedition throughout the voyage, and the great discomfort and danger that would have been experienced in stormy weather was avoided.

Previous to the departure of the expedition the question of the best point and method of attack had been carefully considered, and I had obtained and furnished the Commanding General with maps and photographs of the country.

Covered by the Navy, on the 22d of June, a landing was effected by part of the troops at Daiquiri, and on the following day the remainder were landed at Siboney. The distances to these points from Santiago were very short, that from Daiquiri being not over sixteen miles, while the distance from Siboney was not over ten miles. The roads, however, were very poor, and the movement of supplies and artillery was difficult.

The troops had been landed, largely by the Navy, in a very short time, but the landing of artillery and general supplies was a much more difficult matter, the number of tugs, lighters, etc., being in every way insufficient. It was with great difficulty that enough supplies were landed for the absolute wants of the troops, while the necessity of providing for a number of refugees who had left Santiago made the conditions still worse.

The advance upon Santiago, the fights at Las Guasimas, El Caney and San Juan, and the final surrender, have been described so often that it is unnecessary to go into detail regarding them. The bravery of our troops, the energy and fortitude displayed by them under the most adverse circumstances, are a monument to their character.

The reports of General Shafter and his Division Commanders, Wheeler, Kent, Lawton, Bates and Sumner, show the number of troops, the difficulties encountered and the obstacles overcome.

A rough and broken country, covered with dense tropical forests and jungles, cut by only a few narrow roads and paths, made it difficult for the troops to push their way through, against even the small force of Spanish troops that disputed their way. Fortunately, our officers and soldiers had been accustomed to manœuver through thickets and wildernesses in the Civil War, and through the fastnesses in the Rocky and Sierra Madre Mountains against the wily Indians, and they were undaunted in their efforts against a more passive, yet a brave, foe. Although the advance positions and outer works of the enemy, like the three above mentioned, were held by a very small force, yet, concealed in their intrenchments and with their Mauser rifles, they were able to kill and wound more than half as many of our men in front of their positions as their own troops numbered; but, notwithstanding this sacrifice, the positions were gallantly taken, and a crescent-shaped line was formed, closely investing a good part of the city and garrison of Santiago.

NELSON A. MILES.

(To be Continued.)